Defending the Semantic View: what it takes

Citation data:

European Journal for Philosophy of Science, ISSN: 1879-4912, Vol: 2, Issue: 3, Page: 249-274

Publication Year:
2012
Usage 388
Downloads 388
Captures 10
Readers 10
Citations 2
Citation Indexes 2
Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8599
DOI:
10.1007/s13194-011-0026-6
Author(s):
Soazig Le Bihan
Publisher(s):
Springer Nature, Springer
Tags:
Arts and Humanities
article description
In this paper, a modest version of the Semantic View is motivated as both tenable and potentially fruitful for philosophy of science. An analysis is proposed in which the Semantic View is characterized by three main claims. For each of these claims, a distinction is made between stronger and more modest interpretations. It is argued that the criticisms recently leveled against the Semantic View hold only under the stronger interpretations of these claims. However, if one only commits to the modest interpretation for all the claims, then the view obtained, the Modest Semantic View, is tenable and fruitful for the philosophy of science. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011.

This article has 0 Wikipedia mention.