Auxiliary Assumptions, Unification, and Intelligent Design: A Defense of Contrastive Testability

Publication Year:
2011
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8754
Author(s):
Sebastian Lutz
preprint description
Boudry and Leuridan argue that in a number of cases—and specifically in the case of intelligent design—a theory can be intuitively testable, but not contrastively testable according to Sober’s definition. I argue that their purported counterexamples rely on misunderstandings of the concept of contrastive testability and the version of intelligent design criticized by Sober. I also argue that the liberalization of contrastive testability suggested by Boudry and Leuridan is trivial.

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