Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8861
Author(s):
Kerry McKenzie
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preprint description
This paper aims to open up discussion on the relationship between fundamentality and naturalism, and in particular on the question of whether fundamentality may be denied on naturalistic grounds. A historico-inductive argument for an anti-fundamentalist conclusion, prominent within contemporary metaphysical literature, is examined; finding it wanting, an alternative ‘internal’ strategy is proposed. By means of an example from the history of modern physics - namely S-matrix theory - it is demonstrated that (1) this strategy can generate similar (though not identical) anti-fundamentalist conclusions on more defensible naturalistic grounds, and (2) that fundamentality questions can be empirical questions. Some implications and limitations of the proposed approach are discussed.

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