Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism?

Citation data:

Philosophy of Science, Vol: 78, Issue: 5, Page: 1165-1176

Publication Year:
2011
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9003
Author(s):
Morganti, Matteo
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article description
Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the so-called pessimistic meta-induction on the history of science. Some authors, however, suggested that the preservation of structure across theory-change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. While the possibility of this latter, „ontic‟ form of structural realism has been extensively debated, though, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this paper, I distinguish between two arguments in favour of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature, and find both of them wanting.