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Paul Franceschi
preprint description
In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt-Sowers-Sober analysis. The present line of thought is based on the fact that both aforementioned analyses are based on an inaccurate analogy. After discussing the imperfections of both models, I present then a novel model that fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to the Doomsday argument. This last model also encapsulates both Carter-Leslie's and Eckhardt et al.'s models, and reveals a link with the issue of mind-body dualism. Lastly I argue that this novel analogy, combined with an adequate solution to the reference class problem, leads to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more consensual than the original one

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