Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9592
Author(s):
Samuel Schindler
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preprint description
In this article I argue that a methodological challenge to an integrated history and philosophy of science approach put forth by Ron Giere almost forty years ago can be met by what I call the Kuhnian mode of History and Philosophy of Science (HPS). Although in the Kuhnian mode of HPS norms about science are motivated by historical facts about scientific practice, the justifiers of the constructed norms are not historical facts. The Kuhnian mode of HPS therefore evades the naturalistic fallacy which Giere’s challenge is a version of. Against the backdrop of a discussion of Laudan’s normative naturalism I argue that the Kuhnian mode of HPS is a superior form of naturalism which establishes contact to the practice of science without making itself dependent on its contingencies.

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