Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9837
Author(s):
Benedictus, F. J., Dieks, Dennis
Most Recent Tweet View All Tweets
preprint description
The aim of this article is twofold. First, we shall review and analyse the Neo-Kantian justification for the application of probabilistic concepts in physics that was defended by Hans Reichenbach early in his career, notably in his dissertation of 1916. At first sight this Kantian approach seems to contrast sharply with Reichenbach’s later logical positivist, frequentist viewpoint. But, and this is our second goal, we shall attempt to show that there is an underlying continuity in Reichenbach’s thought: typical features of his early Kantian conceptions can still be recognized in his later work.

This preprint has 0 Wikipedia mention.