Friend or Foe? The Role of State and Mutual Fund Ownership in the Split Share Structure Reform in China

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Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, ISSN: 0022-1090, Vol: 45, Issue: 03, Page: 685-706

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FIRTH, Michael Arthur, LIN, Chen, ZOU, Hong
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Business, Management and Accounting, Economics, Econometrics and Finance
article description
The recent split share structure reform in China involves the nontradable shareholders proposing a compensation package to the tradable shareholders in exchange for the listing rights of their shares. We find that state ownership (the major owners of nontradable shares) has a positive effect on the final compensation ratio. In contrast, mutual fund ownership (the major institutional owner of tradable shares) has a negative effect on the compensation ratio and especially in state-owned firms. The evidence is consistent with our predictions that state shareholders have incentives to complete the reform quickly and exert political pressure on mutual funds to accept the terms without a fight. Copyright © 2010 Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington.

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