Intuitions in Science

Citation data:

Intuitions, Page: 119-134

Publication Year:
2014
Usage 88
Downloads 71
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Citations 3
Citation Indexes 3
Repository URL:
http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/2258, https://works.bepress.com/darrellrowbottom/21
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.003.0007
Author(s):
ROWBOTTOM, Darrell Patrick
Publisher(s):
Oxford University Press (OUP), Oxford University Press
Tags:
thought experiments, empiricism, scientific experiments, James Robert Brown, John Norton, Simon Stevin
book chapter description
This chapter presents and criticizes the two dominant accounts of thought experiments in science, due to James Robert Brown and John Norton; the mechanical thought experiment of Simon Stevin is used as an exemplar. The chapter argues that scientific thought experiments are strongly analogous to their ‘real’, actual physical, counterparts. In each kind of experiment, theoretical context affects which arguments are generated and/or thought to be sustainable on the basis of the states of affairs involved. The difference is whether the states of affairs are hypothetical and/or counterfactual rather than actual. This view is consistent with empiricism concerning scientific thought experiments. On such empiricism, the (good) arguments that it is possible to pump from thought experiments have premises grounded in experience, rather than an additional faculty.

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