Some Puzzles and Unresolved Issues About Quantum Entanglement
 Citation data:

Erkenntnis, ISSN: 01650106, Vol: 80, Issue: 2, Page: 303337
 Publication Year:
 2015
 Repository URL:
 http://philsciarchive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10944
 DOI:
 10.1007/s1067001496278
 Author(s):
 Publisher(s):
 Tags:
 Arts and Humanities; Mathematics
article description
Schrödinger (Proc Camb Philos Soc 31:555–563, 1935) averred that entanglement is the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics. The first part of this paper is simultaneously an exploration of Schrödinger’s claim and an investigation into the distinction between mere entanglement and genuine quantum entanglement. The typical discussion of these matters in the philosophical literature neglects the structure of the algebra of observables, implicitly assuming a tensor product structure of the simple Type I factor algebras used in ordinary Quantum Mechanics (QM). This limitation is overcome by adopting the algebraic approach to quantum physics, which allows a uniform treatment of ordinary QM, relativistic quantum field theory, and quantum statistical mechanics. The algebraic apparatus helps to distinguish several different criteria of quantum entanglement and to prove results about the relation of quantum entanglement to two additional ways of characterizing the classical versus quantum divide, viz. abelian versus nonabelian algebras of observables, and the ability versus inability to interrogate the system without disturbing it. Schrödinger’s claim is reassessed in the light of this discussion. The second part of the paper deals with the relativitytoambiguity threat: the entanglement of a state on a system algebra is entanglement of the state relative to a decomposition of the system algebra into subsystem algebras; a state may be entangled with respect to one decomposition but not another; hence, unless there is some principled way to choose a decomposition, entanglement is a radically ambiguous notion. The problem is illustrated in terms a Realist versus Pragmatist debate, the former claiming that the decomposition must correspond to real as opposed to virtual subsystems, while the latter claims that the real versus virtual distinction is bogus and that practical considerations can steer the choice of decomposition. This debate is applied to the fraught problem of measuring entanglement for indistinguishable particles. The paper ends with some (intentionally inflammatory) remarks about claims in the philosophical literature that entanglement undermines the separability or independence of subsystems while promoting holism.