Opinion Dynamics Under Conformity
SSRN Electronic Journal
2012
- 1Citations
- 2,244Usage
- 13Captures
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Article Description
We present a model of opinion formation where individuals repeatedly engage in discussion and update their opinion in a social network similarly to the DeGroot model. Abstracting from the standard assumption that individuals always report their opinion truthfully, agents in our model interact strategically in the discussion such that their stated opinion can differ from their true opinion. The incentive to do so is induced by agents' preferences for conformity. Highly conforming agents will state an opinion which is close to their neighbors' while agents with low level of conformity may be honest or even overstate their opinion. We model opinion formation as a dynamic process and identify conditions for convergence to consensus. Studying the consensus in detail, we show that an agent's social in influence on the consensus opinion is increasing in network centrality and decreasing in the level of conformity. Thus, lower conformity fosters opinion leadership. Moreover, assuming that the initial opinion is a noisy signal about some true state of the world, we consider the mean squared error of the consensus as an estimator for the true state of the world. We show that a society is "wise," i.e. the mean squared error is smaller, if players who are well informed are less conform, while uninformed players conform more with their neighbors.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2105602; http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2105602; http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2222545; http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2222545; https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2105602; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2222545; https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2222545; https://ssrn.com/abstract=2222545; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2105602; https://ssrn.com/abstract=2105602
Elsevier BV
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