The Role of Own-Source Tax Revenue in Disciplining Local Government Spending
2024
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Paper Description
This study examines the role of own-source tax revenue in disciplining local government spending. We ask whether the Italian Imposta Municipale Unica (IMU) tax reform of 2012, which replaced national transfers with local property taxes, affected local government cost management. We find that municipalities more affected by the reform paid significantly less for public works after the reform without incurring greater delays in contract execution or cost overruns. We also find evidence that the cost savings resulted from local officials achieving greater price discounts and awarding more contracts to non-local vendors. Consistent with increased accountability explaining the improvements in cost savings, our results are stronger for municipalities with incumbent mayors facing re-election.
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