The preface paradox dissolved

Citation data:

Theoria, ISSN: 0040-5825, Vol: 53, Issue: 2-3, Page: 121-140

Publication Year:
1987
Usage 35
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Citation Indexes 4
Repository URL:
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/256; https://works.bepress.com/john_williams/15; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1255&context=soss_research
DOI:
10.1111/j.1755-2567.1987.tb00706.x
Author(s):
WILLIAMS, John N.
Publisher(s):
Wiley-Blackwell; Wiley
Tags:
Arts and Humanities; Basic or Discovery Scholarship; Philosophy; Humanities
article description
The preface paradox strikes us as puzzling because we feel that if a person holds a set of inconsistent beliefs, i.e. beliefs such that at least one of them must be correct, then he should give at least one of them up. Equally, if a person's belief is rational, then he has a right to hold it. Yet the preface example is prima facie a case in which a person holds an inconsistent set of beliefs each of which is rational, and thus a case in which that person has a duty to relinquish what he has a right to keep.