Cognitive Integration and the Extended Mind

Citation data:

Page: 227-243

Publication Year:
2010
Usage 104
Abstract Views 104
Repository URL:
https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers/992
Author(s):
Menary, Richard A
Tags:
Cognitive; Integration; Extended; Mind; Arts and Humanities; Social and Behavioral Sciences
book description
The first wave of arguments I for the extended mind focuses on questions of functional parity between internal and external processes and especially the functional role of causal coupling between internal vehicles and external vehicles. The arguments and examples of Clark and Chalmers (1998, reprinted in this volume) have come under pressure from internalist critics such as Adams and Aizawa (2001, this volume) and Rupert (2004, this volume), who have targeted the arguments from functional parity and causal coupling. However, there is also a second wave of arguments for the extended mind, which focuses on questions of the complementarity of internal and external vehicles (Sutton this volume) and their consequent integration into a cognitive whole (Menary 2007, this chapter). This second wave of arguments also takes a more enactive approach to cognition, seeing it as constituted by our bodily activities in the world in conjunction with neural processes and vehicles (Rowlands 1999, this volume; Wilson 2004, this volume).