On combinatorial optimization games
2014
- 9Usage
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Metrics Details
- Usage9
- Abstract Views9
Thesis / Dissertation Description
In this paper, based on the article entitled Cooperative Combinatorial Games written by Imma Curiel which was published in the year 2008 in Pareto Optimality, Game Theory And Equilibria, we study how the players who have formed a coalition would minimize their costs or maximize their pro ts. Cost allocations were also discussed as this arises from the question - how will the pro t or cost of a speci c game be divided among the players who have coordinated. A solution concept, the core, for a cooperative game is partially discussed. Games arising from cooperative combinatorial games are also discussed.
Bibliographic Details
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