On determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game
2014
- 12Usage
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Metrics Details
- Usage12
- Abstract Views12
Thesis / Dissertation Description
This paper will discuss an inspection game model between an inspector and multiple inspectees based on the work of Yael Deutsch, Boaz Golany and Uriel G. Rothblum published on the European Journal of Operational Research on January 2011. An inspection game is a situation where an inspector veri es the adherence of an inspectee to prescribed regulations. This paper shows a lemma, a theorem and their detailed proofs in nding all the possible Nash equilibria of such single-stage inspection game with multiple inspectees.
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