A Multi-Group Public Goods Game Experiment
2024
- 73Usage
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Metrics Details
- Usage73
- Downloads41
- Abstract Views32
Thesis / Dissertation Description
People belong to many different groups, and few belong to the same network of groups. Moreover, people routinely reduce their involvement in dysfunctional groups while increasing involvement in those they find more attractive. The net effect can be an increase in overall cooperation and the partial isolation of free-riders, even if free-riders are never punished, excluded, or recognized. We test this conjecture with a multi-good extension of the standard finitely repeated public goods game. Our results from four treatments suggest that the multi-group setting indeed raises overall cooperation and dampens the impact of free-riders.
Bibliographic Details
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/behavioral_and_computational_economics_theses/4/; http://dx.doi.org/10.36837/chapman.000598; https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/behavioral_and_computational_economics_theses/4; https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=behavioral_and_computational_economics_theses; https://dx.doi.org/10.36837/chapman.000598
Chapman University
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