Form and Matter in Kant's Theoretical Philosophy

This dissertation examines the use of the terms “form” and “matter” in Kant’s theoretical philosophy from his earliest publications up to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). I argue that these two concepts have received unfortunately little attention in the development of Kant’s thought and in his mature writings. I begin in Chapter One by examining his increasing use of them in his pre-critical writings culminating in the Inaugural Dissertation (1770), where he first develops his theory of space as a form of intuition. Then in Chapters Two to Five, I examine his account of them in his accounts of space, time, and the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. Throughout the dissertation, but especially in Chapter Three, I attend to the historical evolution of the concepts of form and matter, and I argue that Kant’s use of these terms draws, not directly on Aristotle himself who introduced them to philosophy, but rather to a logical tradition that appropriated and transformed from Aristotle’s original physical and metaphysical use of them. In Chapter Four I attempt a novel interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, and I argue in particular that the notion of “reality” must be interpreted in terms of the lawfulness of appearances rather than as externality to the mind. Throughout the dissertation I argue that Kant’s use of these terms results in failure: he is unable to explain how the forms of experience (whether they be space, time, or the categories) relate to the matter or content of experience. In this way, I argue that Kant fails to meet the challenge of Humean skepticism.