Privatization in emerging economies: An agency theory perspective
Academy of Management Review, ISSN: 0363-7425, Vol: 25, Issue: 3, Page: 650-669
2000
- 547Citations
- 2,336Usage
- 472Captures
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Metrics Details
- Citations547
- Citation Indexes544
- 544
- CrossRef375
- Academic Citation Index (ACI) - airiti3
- Policy Citations3
- Policy Citation3
- Usage2,336
- Downloads2,138
- 2,138
- Abstract Views198
- Captures472
- Readers472
- 472
Review Description
The ineffectiveness of several privatized firms within emerging economies underscores the importance of agency theory issues and their impact on the privatization-performance relationship. We argue that weak governance and limited protection of minority shareholders intensify traditional principal-agent problems (perquisite consumption and entrenchment) and create unique agency problems (expropriation). We suggest that postprivatization performance can be enhanced by using appropriate ownership, management, and corporate structures that mitigate agency problems in the context of weak governance, and we highlight avenues for research.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=0034339147&origin=inward; http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2000.3363533; http://journals.aom.org/doi/10.5465/amr.2000.3363533; https://journals.aom.org/doi/10.5465/amr.2000.3363533; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/4632; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5631&context=lkcsb_research; https://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2000.3363533
Academy of Management
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