The Economics of Hedge Fund Startups: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Journal of Finance, ISSN: 1540-6261, Vol: 76, Issue: 3, Page: 1427-1469
2021
- 11Citations
- 141Usage
- 62Captures
Metric Options: Counts1 Year3 YearSelecting the 1-year or 3-year option will change the metrics count to percentiles, illustrating how an article or review compares to other articles or reviews within the selected time period in the same journal. Selecting the 1-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year. Selecting the 3-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year plus the two years prior.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Metrics Details
- Citations11
- Citation Indexes11
- CrossRef11
- Usage141
- Downloads123
- Abstract Views18
- Captures62
- Readers62
- 62
Article Description
This paper examines how market frictions influence the managerial incentives and organizational structure of new hedge funds. We develop a stylized model in which new managers search for accredited investors and have stronger incentives to acquire managerial skill when encountering low investor demand. Fund families endogenously arise to mitigate frictions and weaken the performance incentives of affiliated new funds. Empirically, based on a TASS-HFR-BarclayHedge merged database, we find that ex ante identified cold inceptions facing low investor demand outperform existing hedge funds and hot inceptions facing high demand and that cold stand-alone inceptions outperform all types of family-affiliated inceptions.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85102055922&origin=inward; http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13009; https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jofi.13009; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/7056; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8055&context=lkcsb_research; https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13009
Wiley
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