Constitutional supremacy, inherent powers, and orders that damages or costs be paid in instalments: Tan Meow Hiang v Ong Kay Yong [2023] SGHC 286

The General Division of the High Court of Singapore stated (obiter) in Tan Meow Hiang v Ong Kay Yong that it does not have a general power to order that damages or costs be paid in instalments. It reasoned that any such power must have been impliedly restricted by legislation. So instalment orders can only be made (a) by certain subordinate courts; (b) by the General Division on appeal; (c) by the General Division at first instance in personal injury cases. In response, this note aims to advance the conversation on the law on instalment orders and what the Constitution has to say about the courts’ inherent powers. There are possible arguments, based on constitutional principle and/or constitutional history, that legislation purporting to take away certain powers from the courts is unconstitutional, or at least that the courts should be slow to hold that such powers have been taken away. Anyway, the legislation which the General Division cited arguably did not take away the powers to make instalment orders; neither do common-law rules such as the rule that damages are ordered “once and for all”. Therefore, we need not rely on legislative reform to avoid the uneasy conclusion which the General Division felt compelled to reach.