Essays in Industrial Organization and Regulation

This dissertation is comprised of two essays; in the first, I develop a model to show that when there is a sufficiently large segment of uninformed consumers and an existing norm regarding the advertising of bundled good prices that price obfuscation through base good advertisements can be both: (1) profit maximizing, and (2) result in an equilibrium where only some firms obfuscate. I provide the first empirical evidence of this setting by estimating the increase in prices charged by retail gasoline stations, finding a statistically and economically significant obfuscating premium of 5-7 cents per gallon. I also provide evidence of spillover effects wherein an obfuscating firm can lead to higher prices at all firms present in a market, supporting the feasibility of asymmetric obfuscation strategies. In the second, I explore early evidence of the impacts of upstream gasoline regulations in California. In 2023, California implemented the California Gas Price Gouging and Transparency Law to eliminate perceived price gouging by in-state refineries by implementing reporting measures, establishing a market oversight committee, and expanding regulators’ ability to set maximum margins for refineries. I find statistically and economically significantly higher prices in the post-treatment period. The increase is unlikely to be attributable to supply constraints, demand shocks, branded gasoline, production capacity, or spot market activity. These results are consistent with the leg- islative timing and may be attributable to the law itself. However, data limitations leave open the possibility for future research to uncover yet unknown or unobservable cost shocks.