Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency
2002
- 244Usage
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Metrics Details
- Usage244
- Downloads206
- Abstract Views38
Book Description
The author points out that Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) insurgents actively are pursuing a strategy to mobilize the disaffected and disposed people of Colombia, and to control the entire national territory. At the same time, he argues that no one in the national political establishment has taken the initiative to conduct an appropriate effort to deny FARC its objective. As a result, the Colombian Army has been left alone to direct the fight, without a coordinated and integrated national campaign plan or other resources that would allow for success. The author concludes that the Army has bought time, and there is still an opportunity for the United States to help Colombia deal with its insurgent threat in new ways.
Bibliographic Details
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