The Partiality Norm: Systematic Deference in the Office of Legal Counsel
Vol: 103, Issue: 3, Page: 757-816
2018
- 730Usage
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Metrics Details
- Usage730
- Downloads584
- Abstract Views146
Artifact Description
This study shows that the Office of Legal Counsel does not offer "detached, apolitical legal advice" in practice. Rather, the OLC is deeply and systematically deferential to the President. The implications are grave considering the OLC's de facto lawmaking power, a result of its position as legal adviser for the executive-- "the judgment of [the OLC] . . . becomes the law." Moreover, the OLC "is frequently asked to opine on issues of first impression that are unlikely to be resolved by the courts--a circumstance in which OLC's advice may effectively be the final word on the controlling law." Whether the OLC facilitates the extra-constitutional and extra-legal expansion of executive powers depends on the implementation of sufficient remedies for the problem of partiality.
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