Effectiveness and detection of denial-of-service attacks in tor

Citation data:

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, ISSN: 1094-9224, Vol: 15, Issue: 3, Page: 1-25

Publication Year:
2012
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Repository URL:
https://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/compfacpub/40; https://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/compfacpub/1; https://works.bepress.com/ndanner/13; http://arxiv.org/abs/1110.5395
DOI:
10.1145/2382448.2382449
Author(s):
Danner, Norman; DeFabbia-Kane, Samuel P; Krizanc, Danny; Liberatore, Marc
Publisher(s):
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Tags:
Computer Science; Engineering; Anonymity; denial of service; onion routing; Computer Science - Cryptography and Security; Computer Science - Networking and Internet Architecture; C.2.0; K.4.1; OS and Networks
article description
Amherst Tor is one of the more popular systems for anonymizing near-real-time communications on the Internet. Borisov et al. [2007] proposed a denial-of-service-based attack on Tor (and related systems) that significantly increases the probability of compromising the anonymity provided. In this article, we analyze the effectiveness of the attack using both an analytic model and simulation.We also describe two algorithms for detecting such attacks, one deterministic and proved correct, the other probabilistic and verified in simulation. © 2012 ACM.