It Takes Two to Proliferate: Nuclear Supply and the Grand Bargain
SSRN Electronic Journal
2011
- 707Usage
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Article Description
Questions and concerns regarding nuclear proliferation have engaged security scholars for decades. Why do some states proliferate, while others decide not to? What roles do international institutions, norms, and the balancing of power play in such decisions? These questions and many others address proliferation from the demand-side. In this article, we approach proliferation from the opposite angle - the supply-side. Why do nuclear states decide to help nonnuclear states proliferate? Why do these supplier states decide to help these particular recipient states, and not any others? To answer these questions we propose a bargaining theory of nuclear assistance, where relational factors, domestic players, critical bargaining chips, and international constraints interact to explain the success or failure of the nuclear collaboration.
Bibliographic Details
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