Legislative Review and Party Differentiation in Coalition Governments
APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Paper Description
Coalition governance requires compromise and this compromise can lead to electoral losses. In this essay I argue that coalition parties are motivated to differentiate themselves from their partners in order mitigate possible electoral losses resulting from voters perceiving them as too cooperative, not rigorously pursuing their core policy positions, or selling out. I support this argument with original data on the legislative review process in Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands that incorporates data on voter perceptions of partisan ideology. I find that coalition parties amend the legislation of their partners more freely when they are perceived by voters as growing more similar to their partners — an indication that voters perceive an overly accommodative policy process; i.e., that the parties are not vehemently pursuing their core policies. The findings presented here serve to improve our understanding of coalition politics and legislative review in consensual democracies. This essay is also novel in that it is the first essay to incorporate voters directly into a comparative empirical model of legislative behavior, rather than simply assuming an electoral connection.
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