Game Theory for International Accords
SSRN, ISSN: 1556-5068
2020
- 1,753Usage
Metric Options: Counts1 Year3 YearSelecting the 1-year or 3-year option will change the metrics count to percentiles, illustrating how an article or review compares to other articles or reviews within the selected time period in the same journal. Selecting the 1-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year. Selecting the 3-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year plus the two years prior.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Article Description
Realpolitik is the claim that agreements in international relations are worthless since there is no institution to enforce them. Game theoretician Robert J. Aumann suggests in his Nobel lecture (2006) that “The fundamental insight is that repetition is like an enforcement mechanism” . The application of this insight to international relations allows for the improvement of their applicability and thus it refutes Realpolitik. Early game theory appeared as an alternative to the social sciences; it is better anchored within the social science — as a useful tool. This renders game-theoretical recommendations irenic. Aumann (1990) argues that there is no a priori reason to expect that agreement to cooperate should have practical results. His claim rests on an additional assumption: at times no improvement is observed. Yet at times significant improvement is observed. This should encourage the search for the conditions that lead to improvement; it goes well with the proposal to consider game theory part-and-parcel of social science: how does playing in a given game depend the culture within which it takes place.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85112185419&origin=inward; http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3533335; https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3533335; https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3533335; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3533335; https://ssrn.com/abstract=3533335
Elsevier BV
Provide Feedback
Have ideas for a new metric? Would you like to see something else here?Let us know