Block Diversity and Governance
SSRN, ISSN: 1556-5068
2021
- 3,296Usage
- 7Captures
Metric Options: CountsSelecting the 1-year or 3-year option will change the metrics count to percentiles, illustrating how an article or review compares to other articles or reviews within the selected time period in the same journal. Selecting the 1-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year. Selecting the 3-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year plus the two years prior.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Article Description
We show that different kinds of blockholders drive different forms of corporate governance. Nonfinancial blockholders are six times more likely to self-identify as active shareholders relative to financial blockholders. Textual analysis of regulatory filings reveal that nonfinancial blocks intend to govern through voice rather than exit. Firms with nonfinancial blockholders are more likely to have corporate governance practices that reflect active governance through shareholder voice rather than the threat of exit. We document a strong positive announcement return for nonfinancial blockholders, especially in small, volatile, and illiquid firms where the marginal benefit of monitoring via voice may be larger.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85110863434&origin=inward; http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3810532; https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3810532; https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3810532; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3810532; https://ssrn.com/abstract=3810532
Elsevier BV
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