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Delegating Decisions to Experts

Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 112, No. 1, Pt. 2, pp. S311-S335, February 2004
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    793
    • Abstract Views
      793

Paper Description

We present a model of delegation with self-interested and privately informed experts. A team of experts with extreme but opposite biases is acceptable to a wide range of decision makers with diverse preferences, but the value of expertise from such a team is low. A decision maker wants to appoint experts who are less partisan than he is in order to facilitate information pooling by the expert team. Selective delegation, either by controlling the decision-making process or by conditioning the delegation decision on his own information, is an effective way for the decision maker to safeguard own interests while making use of expert information.

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