Frege’s Puzzle: Can we pose it on Frege’s Behalf?

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Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica; Revista de Filosofía: Volumen 53, Número 136, ISSN: 0034-8252, Vol: n 53, Issue: 136

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Ruffino, Marco
Universidad de Costa Rica
frege’s puzzle; identity; cognitive value; names; demonstratives; puzzle de frege; identidad; valor cognitivo; nombres; demostrativos
article description
In this paper I first review the main elements of the so-called Frege’s Puzzle, and argue that there is something odd in the argument that Frege builds based on it: Frege first rejects a possible hypothesis for the nature of identity in order to make plausible the distinction between sense and reference. But, after the distinction is made, the rejected hypothesis is the only one compatible with it after all. Next, I discuss Glezakos’ (2009) position regarding the Puzzle. I argue that, although she does point out something quite important, we do not have to accept her conclusion that there is no puzzle that can be formulated in neutral terms.