What ‘biological racial realism’ should mean

Citation data:

Philosophical Studies, ISSN: 0031-8116, Vol: 159, Issue: 2, Page: 181-204

Publication Year:
2012
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Repository URL:
https://repository.usfca.edu/phil/11
DOI:
10.1007/s11098-011-9697-2
Author(s):
Spencer, Quayshawn
Publisher(s):
Springer Nature
Tags:
Arts and Humanities; Race; Natural kind; Genuine kind; Biological racial realism; The race debate; Cladistic race; Philosophy
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article description
A curious ambiguity has arisen in the race debate in recent years. That ambiguity is what is actually meant by 'biological racial realism'. Some philosophers mean that 'race is a natural kind in biology', while others mean that 'race is a real biological kind'. However, there is no agreement about what a natural kind or a real biological kind should be in the race debate. In this article, I will argue that the best interpretation of 'biological racial realism' is one that interprets 'biological racial realism' as 'race is a genuine kind in biology', where a genuine kind is a valid kind in a well-ordered scientific research program. I begin by reviewing previous interpretations of 'biological racial realism' in the race debate. Second, I introduce the idea of a genuine kind and compare it to various notions of natural and real biological kinds used in the race debate. Third, I present and defend an argument for my view. Fourth, I provide a few interesting consequences of my view for the race debate. Last, I provide a summary of the article. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.