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R&D incentives and competitive pressure under hidden information

Southern Economic Journal, ISSN: 0038-4038, Vol: 88, Issue: 1, Page: 56-78
2021
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Article Description

Within a principal-agent model, the paper studies how hidden information affects incentives to invest in demand-enhancing R&D of a firm competing in the product market. The analysis shows that, when the R&D outcome is private information of the innovating firm not only compared to its competitor, but also relative to its supplier, a contractual cost arises which neutralizes the standard strategic benefit of R&D and reduces the incentives to invest. Moreover, within this setting, more intense competition always stifles innovation.

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