Causes and consequences of coalitional cognition

What is a group? How do we know to which groups we belong? How do we assign others to groups? A great deal of theorizing across the social sciences, has conceptualized “groups” as synonymous with “categories.” There are significant limitations to this approach, however, particularly for making predictions about novel intergroup contexts and about how intergroup dynamics will change over time. Here I systematize the conditions under which a generalized coalitional psychology gets activated—the recognition of another's capacity for and likelihood of coordination not only with oneself but with others. First, I synthesize recent developments in research on the cognitive processes that give rise to the inference of coalitions and group-biased preferences (even in the absence of category labels). Then I review downstream consequences of inferences about capacity and likelihood of coordination for valuation, emotions, attribution, and inter-coalitional harm. Finally, I discuss ways to use these psychological levers to attenuate intergroup hostility.