Can centralized land supply reduce the excessive land premium rate? Evidence from China cities

The use of government regulation and intervention to stabilize the land market is the focus of many scholars. Irrational demand, information asymmetry, and high premium rates remain prominent in China's urban land market. It is urgent to calm irrational expectations and foster reasonable land price. Therefore, China has carried out “centralized land supply (CLS)” policy experiments in 22 pilot cities that disclose land supply information and supply land at fixed time points every year. CLS can serve as a new type of government intervention experiment in land market. Unlike previous policies of concentrating supply in spatial dimension, CLS emphasizes centralization in quantity and time. The study compares the impacts of “centralized” and “normal” urban land supply on the land premium rate and verify the effectiveness of policy tools. The results show that CLS can reduce the premium rate by 51.46 % on the original basis. Under strict implementation without scattered supply interference, this policy can demonstrate a better effect on reducing premium rates. In addition, policy tools can be used in diverse contexts to reduce premium rates. We suggest that centralized land supply can serve as an effective tool for reducing land premium rates in the short term. And the government cannot always adopt a slow transition intervention strategy in land market, because the lax implementation in CLS disrupts the information disclosure and supply-demand state of the land market, exacerbating market failure problems.