A quest between fiscal and market discipline
Economic Modelling, ISSN: 0264-9993, Vol: 119, Page: 106119
2023
- 5Citations
- 15Captures
Metric Options: Counts1 Year3 YearSelecting the 1-year or 3-year option will change the metrics count to percentiles, illustrating how an article or review compares to other articles or reviews within the selected time period in the same journal. Selecting the 1-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year. Selecting the 3-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year plus the two years prior.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Article Description
Fiscal rules are typically seen as government constraints. Yet, the extent to which they are substituted or complemented by market discipline (especially, during financial stress) remains unexplored. Using data for 71 countries over the period 1985–2015, we estimate an “augmented” fiscal reaction function to assess the impact of both fiscal and market discipline. We find that different market signals influence fiscal policy, but fiscal discipline depends on market incentives. In the EU and the OECD, market signals complement fiscal rules. These are less effective in the EMU and non-OECD countries that are “debt intolerant”. Yet, there are unintended consequences: (i) neither output and debt stabilisation, nor fiscal rules affect the fiscal stance in the absence of financial crises; and (ii) financial stress makes fiscal discipline a destabilising factor, while central bank actions almost dismiss it. Finally, market (fiscal) discipline effects are (not) persistent and stronger (more uncertain) for the EMU.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026499932200356X; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2022.106119; http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85144082496&origin=inward; https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S026499932200356X; https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2022.106119
Elsevier BV
Provide Feedback
Have ideas for a new metric? Would you like to see something else here?Let us know