Carbon emission reduction behavior strategies in the shipping industry under government regulation: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

Carbon emission reduction in the shipping industry is both an external requirement of the government and an intrinsic sustainable development task for ports and shipping enterprises. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, port enterprises, and shipping enterprises, analyzes the evolution of the carbon emission reduction strategy choice of the three parties, and studies the mechanisms driving the interaction and influencing the subjects’ choices. The results show that (1) to promote carbon emission reduction in the shipping industry, the evolutionarily stable strategy of the three stakeholders is as follows: the government actively regulates, the port enterprises actively reduce emissions, and the shipping enterprises actively reduce emissions. (2) With an increase in the additional cost of government regulation and a decrease in rewards to port enterprises, the probability of the government actively regulating carbon emissions reduction will rise, and the probability of port enterprises actively implementing carbon emission reduction will increase following a reduction in the additional cost and an increase in the opportunity cost of passive emission reduction. (3) An increase in government subsidies for shipping enterprises will lead to a decrease in the additional costs of active emission reduction and an increase in the probability of active carbon emission reduction. This paper provides policy recommendations for carbon emission reduction in the shipping industry, which will help all parties choose the optimal strategy and achieve carbon emission reduction goals as soon as possible.