Why we can't say what animals think
Philosophical Psychology, ISSN: 0951-5089, Vol: 26, Issue: 4, Page: 520-546
2013
- 24Citations
- 41Captures
- 8Mentions
Metric Options: CountsSelecting the 1-year or 3-year option will change the metrics count to percentiles, illustrating how an article or review compares to other articles or reviews within the selected time period in the same journal. Selecting the 1-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year. Selecting the 3-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year plus the two years prior.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Most Recent News
BEYOND LOCAL: Can we really know what animals are thinking?
This article, written by Jacob Beck , York University, Canada , originally appeared on The Conversation and is republished here with permission: Sarah, “ the
Article Description
Realists about animal cognitive representations confront a puzzle. If animals have real, contentful cognitive representations, why can't anyone say precisely what the contents of those representations are? I argue that realists can best resolve this puzzle by appealing to differences in the format of animal cognition and human language. © 2013 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.
Bibliographic Details
Provide Feedback
Have ideas for a new metric? Would you like to see something else here?Let us know