The audit committee and dividend policy: an empirical study of the post-SOX era
Corporate Governance (Bingley), ISSN: 1472-0701, Vol: 24, Issue: 2, Page: 346-364
2024
- 30Captures
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Metrics Details
- Captures30
- Readers30
- 30
Article Description
Purpose: Post-Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), the audit committee has been empowered greatly to play a central role in the corporate governance of firms. Embedded in agency theory, this study aims to examine the effect of the audit committee on the likelihood by firms to pay dividends. Design/methodology/approach: The study population is US firms in the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) database from 2007 to 2018. The authors apply the multivariate logit fixed-effect regression for the analyses after conducting the appropriate statistical tests. Findings: From the results of the research model, the authors find that there is a positive relationship between the size and gender diversity of the audit committee and the propensity to pay dividends suggesting that a larger audit committee with substantial women representation improve the information environment in firms leading to higher dividend distribution. The extent of busyness of the audit committee impacts negatively on the propensity to pay dividends. The results are driven by high-performing firms and not driven by specific levels of firm size. Research limitations/implications: The findings of the study give impetus to the audit committee as an important component of the corporate governance mechanism that advances the interest of stakeholders. Thus, efforts that seeks to promote the audit committee’s resourcefulness must be embraced by all stakeholders. Originality/value: To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to focus on audit committee and dividend payout policy of US firms post-SOX. The study demonstrates how the audit committee characteristics including its size, gender diversity and busyness affect dividend policy by mitigating information asymmetry problems.
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