Is corporate board more effective under IFRS or "It's Just an Illusion"?
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, ISSN: 2160-4061, Vol: 29, Issue: 1, Page: 31-60
2014
- 20Citations
- 77Captures
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Article Description
The present study contends that the increased effectiveness of corporate boards in constraining earnings management around International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) introduction might be "transitory" and fade away over time. Drawing on the attentionbased view (ABV) of the firm, we argue that the higher effectiveness of corporate boards might have been driven by a temporary higher level of attention, which independent directors (INDs) and audit committees (ACs) allocated to accounting issues at the time of transition to IFRS. Our empirical results highlight that corporate board's effectiveness reaches its peak around the adoption time, showing an "inverted-U" path. This study contributes to the current debate on the extent to which additional contextual factors might prevail on accounting standard regulation-per se-in improving earnings quality. We further suggest that boards' effectiveness in monitoring the corporate financial accounting process is contextually dependent. © The Author(s) 2013.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=84900868995&origin=inward; http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0148558x13512405; https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0148558X13512405; http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0148558X13512405; http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0148558X13512405; http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full-xml/10.1177/0148558X13512405
SAGE Publications
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