Group decisions in biodiversity conservation: Implications from game theory

Background: Decision analysis and game theory [1,2] have proved useful tools in various biodiversity conservation planning and modeling contexts [3-5]. This paper shows how game theory may be used to inform group decisions in biodiversity conservation scenarios by modeling conflicts between stakeholders to identify Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. These are cases in which each agent pursuing individual self-interest leads to a worse outcome for all, relative to other feasible outcomes. Three case studies from biodiversity conservation contexts showing this feature are modeled to demonstrate how game-theoretical representation can inform group decision-making. Methodology and Principal Findings: The mathematical theory of games is used to model three biodiversity conservation scenarios with Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria: (i) a two-agent case involving wild dogs in South Africa; (ii) a three-agent raptor and grouse conservation scenario from the United Kingdom; and (iii) an n-agent fish and coral conservation scenario from the Philippines. In each case there is reason to believe that traditional mechanism-design solutions that appeal to material incentives may be inadequate, and the game-theoretical analysis recommends a resumption of further deliberation between agents and the initiation of trust-and confidence-building measures. Conclusions and Significance: Game theory can and should be used as a normative tool in biodiversity conservation contexts: identifying scenarios with Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria enables constructive action in order to achieve (closer to) optimal conservation outcomes, whether by policy solutions based on mechanism design or otherwise. However, there is mounting evidence [6] that formal mechanism-design solutions may backfire in certain cases. Such scenarios demand a return to group deliberation and the creation of reciprocal relationships of trust. © 2010 Frank, Sarkar.