Competition and Information Leakage
Journal of Political Economy, ISSN: 1537-534X, Vol: 132, Issue: 5, Page: 1603-1641
2024
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Metric Options: Counts1 Year3 YearSelecting the 1-year or 3-year option will change the metrics count to percentiles, illustrating how an article or review compares to other articles or reviews within the selected time period in the same journal. Selecting the 1-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year. Selecting the 3-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year plus the two years prior.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Most Recent News
Joshua Mollner: Competition and Information Leakage Huxley Building, South Kensington Campus
When seeking to trade in over-the-counter markets, institutional investors typically restrict both the number of potential counterparties they contact and the information they disclose (e.g.,
Article Description
When seeking to trade in over-the-counter markets, institutional investors typically restrict both the number of potential counterparties they contact and the information they disclose (e.g., by requesting two-sided rather than one-sided quotes). We rationalize these important facts in a model featuring endogenous front-running. Although an additional contact inten-sifies competition and aids in finding a natural counterparty, it also inten-sifies information leakage—which can be costly if it helps a losing dealer to front-run. We also address information design: the client optimally pro-vides no information about her trading direction when requesting quotes. We conclude with implications for market design and regulation.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85194471591&origin=inward; http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/727709; http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85110749926&origin=inward; http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3744499; https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3744499; https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/727709; https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3744499; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3744499; https://ssrn.com/abstract=3744499
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