Selective Exposure Reduces Voluntary Contributions: Experimental Evidence from the German Internet

Can strategic information acquisition harm the provision of a public good? We investigate this question in an incentivized online experiment with a large sample of the German population. The marginal returns of the public good are uncertain: it is either socially efficient to contribute or not. Participants can choose between two information sources with opposite biases in the information treatment. One source is more likely to report low marginal returns, whereas the other is more likely to report high marginal returns. We find that information avoidance is a minor phenomenon. Most participants select the source biased towards reporting low marginal returns, independent of their prior beliefs. As a result, the information treatment reduces contributions and increases free-riding. When contributing is socially efficient, the information treatment reduces social welfare.We find that social preferences guide information acquisition: socially-oriented participants are more likely to acquire information and select the source biased towards reporting low marginal returns.