Opinion dynamics game in a social network with two influence nodes
Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, Prikladnaya Matematika, Informatika, Protsessy Upravleniya, ISSN: 2542-2251, Vol: 15, Issue: 1, Page: 118-125
2019
- 21Citations
- 9Captures
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Article Description
We consider an opinion dynamics game in a social network with two influence nodes. Pursuing certain goals, the influence nodes affect other members of the network by the selection of their levels of influence. Considering this model as a 2-person non-cooperative dynamic game and choosing Nash equilibrium as its solution, we find the equilibrium levels of influence for both influence nodes at any game stage. We also perform the numerical simulation for both low and high levels of players’ influence on agents.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85064704735&origin=inward; http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11702/spbu10.2019.109; http://hdl.handle.net/11701/15655; https://dspace.spbu.ru/handle/11701/15655; https://medicine-journal.spbu.ru/article/download/5537/4542; http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu10.2019.109; https://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11702/spbu10.2019.109
Saint Petersburg State University
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