Forms of governance and the size of rent-seeking
Social Choice and Welfare, ISSN: 0176-1714, Vol: 30, Issue: 2, Page: 197-210
2008
- 4Citations
- 15Captures
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
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Article Description
In this paper we present a model where agents can choose between productive and rent-seeking activities. We consider two governance institutions: autocracy and parliament rule. Under autocracy rent-seeking reflects the taste of the autocrat for such activities. Under parliament rule rent-seeking depends on parliament voting. We show that under parliament rule the size of rent-seeking may be larger than under autocracy. This cast doubts on the idea that "rigth" institutions necessarily promote good economic performance. We also show that rent-seekers may be interested in overthrowing autocracy. © 2007 Springer-Verlag.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=38149030904&origin=inward; http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0224-5; http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-007-0224-5; http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s00355-007-0224-5; http://www.springerlink.com/index/pdf/10.1007/s00355-007-0224-5; https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0224-5; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-007-0224-5
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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