Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
Review of Economic Design, ISSN: 1434-4742, Vol: 12, Issue: 4, Page: 279-291
2008
- 2Citations
- 4Captures
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
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Article Description
In this paper, we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. We show that, for two agents, there is no mechanism which is efficient, strategy-proof and where consumption of both goods is positive for all agents. For the case of two or more agents the same result occurs when nondictatorship is replaced by Individual Rationality. © Springer-Verlag 2008.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=56749154385&origin=inward; http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0060-9; http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10058-008-0060-9; http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10058-008-0060-9; http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10058-008-0060-9.pdf; http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10058-008-0060-9/fulltext.html; http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s10058-008-0060-9; http://www.springerlink.com/index/pdf/10.1007/s10058-008-0060-9; https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0060-9; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10058-008-0060-9
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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