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CEO Incentives and Earnings Management

NYU Working Paper No. FIN-05-007
2004
  • 5
    Citations
  • 2,743
    Usage
  • 2
    Captures
  • 0
    Mentions
  • 0
    Social Media
Metric Options:   Counts1 Year3 Year

Metrics Details

  • Citations
    5
    • Citation Indexes
      5
  • Usage
    2,743
    • Abstract Views
      2,272
    • Downloads
      471
  • Captures
    2
    • Readers
      2
      • SSRN
        2
  • Ratings
    • Download Rank
      124,018

Paper Description

We provide evidence that the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reportedearnings is more pronounced at firms where the CEO s potential total compensation is more closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings. In addition, during years of high accruals, CEOs exercise unusually large amounts of options and CEOs and other insiders sell large quantities of shares.

Bibliographic Details

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