Has the European Commission Become More Severe in Punishing Cartels? Effects of the 2006 Guidelines
SSRN Electronic Journal
2010
- 4Citations
- 7,626Usage
- 15Captures
Metric Options: CountsSelecting the 1-year or 3-year option will change the metrics count to percentiles, illustrating how an article or review compares to other articles or reviews within the selected time period in the same journal. Selecting the 1-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year. Selecting the 3-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year plus the two years prior.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Article Description
This paper analyzes the first 13 cartel decisions of the European Commission under its 2006 revised fining guidelines. I find that the severity of the cartel fines is more than five times higher than those figured under the previous 1998 Guidelines. For the first time in antitrust history, I believe we are observing fines that regularly disgorge the monopoly profits accumulated by cartelists. Indeed, three firms’ fines ranged as high as 500% to 650% of affected sales – possible (but rare) examples of supra-deterrence. Nearly all recent cartel decisions reward one or more participant with full or partial leniency, a much higher share than previously. There is no evidence that leniency discounts have led to larger percentage reductions in cartel-wide fines. Moreover, despite more severe fines, the share of defendants requiring reductions under the Commission’s 10% cap or ability-to-pay considerations has not risen. The frequency and size of recidivism discounts has gone up markedly under the new guidelines. There is ample evidence that the Commission has been inconsistent in applying recidivism penalties in the manner promised it its 2006 Guidelines. In particular, it has been lenient by failing to account for numerous previous violations.
Bibliographic Details
Provide Feedback
Have ideas for a new metric? Would you like to see something else here?Let us know