Incumbent Spending and Gubernatorial Elections: An Investigation of Primary Type and Candidate Deviation
Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, Vol. 23, Nos. 1-2, pp. 3-18, 2005
2005
- 535Usage
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Paper Description
In the political science and public choice literature, it has been shown that candidates (i) deviate from their median voter based upon the primary election type, and (ii) are more likely to establish policy positions that deviate from the median voter when the voting system is characterized by closed primaries. This paper examines the relationship between incumbent campaign spending and the degree of openness of political primaries in the United States for gubernatorial elections over the years 1980-2000 to examine if the type of primary system influences campaign spending. The authors find that incumbent candidates who face a more open primary will deviate less and therefore spend less to win elections.
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