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Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment

SSRN Electronic Journal
2012
  • 7
    Citations
  • 857
    Usage
  • 4
    Captures
  • 0
    Mentions
  • 0
    Social Media
Metric Options:   Counts1 Year3 Year

Metrics Details

  • Citations
    7
    • Citation Indexes
      7
  • Usage
    857
    • Abstract Views
      779
    • Downloads
      78
  • Captures
    4
  • Ratings
    • Download Rank
      635,750

Article Description

This paper both theoretically and experimentally studies the properties of plurality and approval voting when the majority is divided as a result of information imperfections. The minority backs a third alternative, which the majority views as strictly inferior. The majority thus faces two problems: aggregating information and coordinating to defeat the minority candidate. Two types of equilibria coexist under plurality: either voters aggregate information, but this requires splitting their votes, or they coordinate but cannot aggregate information. With approval voting, expected welfare is strictly higher, because some voters multiple vote to achieve both goals at once. In the laboratory, we observe both types of equilibrium under plurality. Which one is selected depends on the size of the minority. Approval voting vastly outperforms plurality. Finally, subject behavior suggests the need to study asymmetric equilibria.

Bibliographic Details

Laurent Bouton; Micael Castanheira; Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Elsevier BV

Experiments; Multicandidate Elections; Plurality; Approval Voting

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